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Participation in Heterogeneous
and Homogeneous Groups:

A Theoretical Integration'
M. Hamit Fi?ek
BogaziSi University
Joseph Berger

Stanford University
Robert Z. Norman
Dartmouth College

This article presents a theoretical formulation that integrates,
within the framework of expectation states theory, theories of the
emergence of power-and-prestige orders in status-heterogeneous
and homogeneous task-oriented groups. A model based on this theoretical formulation is constructed and used for predicting participation rates in open interaction settings. The article explores the fit
of the model to data from both status-heterogeneous and statushomogeneous groups.

INTRODUCTION

In a recent paper on models of participation in status-heterogeneous

groups, which follows up on earlier work (Skvoretz 1981; Smith-Lovin,

Skvoretz, and Hudson 1986), John Skvoretz (1988) evaluates data from
six-person discussion groups, collected by Lynn Smith-Lovin et al. (1986),
in which the gender compositions of the groups are systematically varied
from all male to all female. The author's conclusion after assessing the
goodness of fit of a number of models to the data is that, while there is
an undeniable gender effect, none of the models capture the effect adequately. This result highlights a serious gap in theoretical work on
power-and-prestige orders and interaction in task-oriented small groups.

1 We would like to thank Professor Barry Markovsky and the anonymous AJS reviewers for their constructive comments on earlier drafts of this article.

? 1991 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0002-9602/92/9701-0005$01.50
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Participation in Groups
How power-and-prestige orders emerge through interaction in status-

homogeneous groups is fairly well understood. Similarly, how gender
and other status characteristics structure the power-and-prestige order in
status-heterogenous groups is also well-known. However, the issue of
how these two processes interact, as they must in any setting where there

are actors of the same and different status categories at the same time,
has been relatively neglected. We propose to fill this gap by integrating

theories from two different branches of the expectation states programthe evaluation-expectation branch and the status characteristics branch.

We formulate a theory that can account for the emergence of power-andprestige orders in both heterogeneous and homogeneous groups and cap-

tures the feedback of behavior on expectations. Through this theory we
explain how behavior can modify status-based power-and-prestige orders
with a single and uniform set of concepts and assumptions. We also
derive from this theory a model for the prediction of participation rates
in discussion groups and evaluate its fit to data from heterogeneous and
homogeneous groups.

Since the early documentation by Robert Bales et al. (1951) of the
rapid emergence of power-and-prestige orders in status-homogeneous

task-oriented groups studied under laboratory conditions, a considerable
amount of work has gone into the theoretical analysis of the emergence
of status orders in such groups (Bales 1955; Mazur 1973; Berger and

Conner 1974; Berger, Conner, and McKeown 1974; Farraro and Skvoretz 1988). Similarly, work on the mathematical modeling of participation
rates, which are taken to be a primary indicator of power-and-prestige

positions of actors in these groups, has also been extensive (Stefan and
Mishler 1952; Coleman 1960; Horvath 1965; Leik 1967; Kadane and

Lewis 1969; Fi?ek 1974). Of this work, that of Berger and his a
are within the framework of the expectation states theoretical research
program (Berger 1974) and constitute the evaluation-expectation branch
of the program. These theories provide an account of how, in statushomogeneous groups, behavior patterns called cycles or unit action se-

quences lead to the formation of expectations, which in turn structure
the power-and-prestige order.
The other branch of the expectation states research program that is
relevant to our current problem is the status characteristics branch. The

theory of status characteristics and expectation states (Berger, Cohen,

and Zelditch 1966; Berger et al. 1977) is concerned with the effects of
diffuse and specific status characteristics on the emergence of powerand-prestige orders in heterogeneous groups. The mathematical version
of the theory (Berger et al. 1977) incorporates a formalism that provides

guidelines for extending the theory (cf. Berger et al. 1985; Berger, Fisek,

and Norman 1989), and that facilitates the construction of specific mathe115
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matical models. It is this formulation that we will use as the basis of our
proposed integration.

The task of integrating the evaluation-expectation and status characteristic branches of expectation states theory within the framework of the

mathematical formulation involves three major conceptual issues. The
first is obtaining a conceptualization and formal representation of behavior elements that fits into the status characteristics framework. The second is the inclusion of legitimation processes (Ridgeway 1988; Ridgeway
and Berger 1988), which we believe to be relevant to our concerns, within
the same theoretical framework. And the third is the development of a
new measure of expectations, other than expectation advantage, which
can be applied to behaviors involving more than two actors at the same
time.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

A Representation of Behavior Elements
Our analysis of behavior uses the concepts of Joseph Berger and Thomas

L. Conner (1969, 1974). Task-oriented behavior in the small group can
be conceptualized as falling into one of four categories: (1) Performance

output is an act that is either a problem-solving attempt or an attempt

to orient or guide the group's task-performance process. (2) Action opportunities are socially distributed chances to perform. (3) Positive reactions
and (4) negative reactions are statements of positive and negative evaluations of performance outputs, respectively.
The simplest interaction cycle or unit action sequence consists of an
initial action opportunity, a performance output, and a final reward ac-

tion. In general, interaction cycles are considerably more complicated
than this basic cycle. However, complex cycles can be broken down or

"parsed" into sets of basic cycles. An important feature of an interaction
cycle is whether it involves accepted or rejected acts. A sequence including a performance output by one actor and a positive reward action by

another actor directed to the first is an example of an interaction cycle with accepted acts. Negative reward actions imply rejection of acts.
The important point about cycles of accepted acts is that they reflect

agreement between the actors involved since the acts are being mutually
accepted. This mutuality of acceptance is the basis on which social structures are built.2

Our basic contention is that, as interaction in a newly formed group
proceeds, behavior cycles will come to occur in stable patterns. Thus

2 For an extensive discussion of interaction cycles see Berger and Conner (1974).
116
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looking at the interaction between two actors we may find that one is
frequently producing performance outputs, and the other is reacting with
positive reward actions. It is such patterns that have power-and-prestige
implications; they are of special interest for our purposes, and we intro-

duce the concept of behavior interchange pattern to describe them.
A behavior interchange pattern, which we will call a behavior pattern
for short, is a set of interaction cycles or unit sequences such that all
actors involved in the interaction accept the acts, and all cycles have the
same power-and-prestige significance with respect to the actors. Thus,

the pattern of one actor frequently producing performance outputs and
the other(s) reacting with positive reward actions is a behavior interchange pattern that indicates a higher power-and-prestige position for
the first actor relative to the other(s). Note however that it is also possible
to have a behavior pattern such that one actor produces a great many
performance outputs, which another actor dismisses with an occasional
word with the first actor assenting. Such a pattern obviously implies a
lower power-and-prestige position for the first actor and a higher one for
the second. The significance of the pattern is more in the content of the
interaction than in its quantity.
The conception of a behavior pattern as a set of cycles or unit action

sequences raises certain questions: How many cycles are necessary to
make up a set? How consistent must the cycles be in terms of their status
significance? We believe both questions to be of an empirical nature.
The number and degree of consistency of cycles required to constitute a

behavior pattern will be affected by a large number of factors, such as
the content of the interaction, the degree of structural development, and
the context of the group. Given these considerations, an operational

definition of the concept can be given only for specific situations. But for
our purposes a theoretical definition is sufficient, and we define the concept from the points of view of the actors involved. That is, for a set of
cycles to be a behavior interchange pattern, the actors involved must
recognize that one actor has a superior behavior pattern and the other

an inferior behavior pattern. Actors may not articulate the notion, and
they need not even give it conscious thought, but they will recognize the
pattern at some level of perception. Given these considerations we define
the term as below.

DEFINITION 1. A behavior interchange pattern is a set of task behavior

cycles or sequences involving two or more actors, in which the acts are
mutually accepted and in which the sequences are consistent in their
power-and-prestige significance.
A behavior pattern is made up of two complementary parts, a positive

part and a negative part. Thus, when a behavior pattern is established
between two actors, one possesses the superior, or positive part, and the
117
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other the inferior, or negative part. Therefore, a behavior pattern is a
basis of discrimination between actors. By the same token, behavior
patterns also enter into status-organizing processes like other status ele-

ments and combine with other status elements in the formation of aggregated expectation states. We use the symbols b(+) and b(-) in the
graphic representation of status situations to represent the two parts of

behavior patterns. The two parts are connected by a dimensionality relation that represents both their linkage and opposition to each other.

A second basic concept, that of a status typification (cf. Berger and
Luckmann 1966), provides the linkage of behavior patterns to the task.

Status typifications are classifications of behaviors into differentially evaluated types or states. Status typifications are abstract conceptions of what
high- and low-status behaviors are like and are socially constructed. Dual

terms like "leader-follower" and "initiator-reactor" are expressions of
these abstract constructions. We represent the two typification states as

B( +) and B(-). Typification states are relevant to states of abstract task
ability, which are induced elements in the theory of status characteristics
and expectation states. Behavior-pattern parts are obviously relevant to
typification states, and the basic theoretical idea is that, when behavior

patterns occur in a group, typification states become salient and provide
paths linking actors to the task.
The ideas we have presented are simple and straightforward, so much

so that one might question the necessity of their being treated formally
as we propose to do. However, their formal treatment within the same
framework as status characteristics enables us to analyze situations in
which intuitive understanding of status processes is not possible.

Legitimation

The need to include legitimation dynamics in the current integration
stems from the literature on gender differences in task-performing groups
(see Meeker and Weitzell-O'Neill [1985] and Wagner [1988] for reviews

of this literature). An important finding is that females have trouble
assuming leadership roles and exhibiting leadership behaviors. This is
true not only for mixed gender groups but for all-female groups.
Ridgeway (1988) has suggested that, in all-female groups that function
in male-dominated social contexts, the diffuse status characteristic gender

becomes salient and prevents the females from assuming leadership roles.
The idea that diffuse status characteristics have moral and normative
expectations as well as task-performance expectations associated with

them (Berger et al. 1966; Berger, Rosenholtz, and Zelditch 1980)
has always been a part of the conceptual armory of expectation states
theory.
118
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Within the expectation states framework two theories have elaborated

the ideas necessary for the treatment of legitimation dynamics. Reward-

expectations theory (Berger et al. 1972, 1985) describes and explains how
status characteristics lead to the formation of reward expectations in
status situations. Ridgeway and Berger in their theory of legitimation
(1988) argue that high- and low-valued status positions can be treated as

instances of positively and negatively valued reward objects. From this

perspective, the legitimation process can be described in terms of the
expectations that are formed for actors possessing, on the basis of all
their salient external status characteristics, high- and low-valued status
positions in the group. Their basic argument is that the greater the differ-

entiation that develops in the group between expectations for high- and
low-valued status positions, given that these expectations are consistent
with those for task performance, the greater the likelihood that the
power-and-prestige order becomes a legitimate one.

Behavior patterns are intrinsically relevant to legitimation processes
because, as well as conveying status information, they show actors validating other actors' power-and-prestige positions. The importance of
validation in legitimation processes has been clearly demonstrated by the
works of Zelditch and his associates (Zelditch and Walker 1984; Walker,
Thomas, and Zelditch 1986).

Our conception of how the legitimation of the power-and-prestige order
occurs through the emergence of behavior patterns in an informal task
group of previously unacquainted individuals involves two key theoretical notions: as actors interact, behavior patterns will begin to appear;

these patterns tend to form a configuration that will be (1) "clustered"
and (2) "transitive." By clustered we mean that the initial behavior
patterns to appear will involve a small subset of actors rather than be

distributed among many. The first behavior pattern to be established

between two actors, A and B, with A possessing the superior part, has
the effect of raising A's and lowering B's status with respect to all the
other actors. Therefore, A is more likely than any other actor to produce
performance outputs, to be addressed, or to be given an action opportunity. That is, A is the actor who is most likely to be involved in the next

behavior pattern to emerge in the situation. On the other hand, not only
is B less likely to produce performance outputs than the other actors, but

also B is likely to be the target of actors who are behaving strategically.
Therefore, B is also more likely than the other actors to be involved in
the next behavior pattern to emerge. Thus, at any time, a new behavior
pattern is more likely to involve an actor who was involved in a previous

behavior pattern than an actor who was not involved. Therefore, behavior patterns will tend to be clustered among a subset of actors rather than
scattered among the entire set.
119
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By saying that the configuration of behaviors will be transitive, we
mean that, if actor A and actor B possess the positive and negative parts
of a behavior pattern, respectively, and if actor B and actor C similarly

share the positive and negative parts of a behavior pattern, then, if actor
A and actor C share a pattern, actor A will possess the positive part, and

actor C will possess the negative part. That is, the actors can be linearly
ordered in terms of their possession of behavior patterns. It is reasonable
to assume that, if A observes B deferring to himself or herself and C
deferring to B, A is unlikely to defer to C.3
The properties of clustering and transitivity present a picture of
power-and-prestige order formation in which a "nucleus" or "core"

forms and increases to a reasonable size-large enough to serve as a
decision-making body or an executive for the group. The same properties
also make it probable that the core will have an internal structure such

that there will be one actor with a number of positive and no negative
parts of behavior patterns. This actor may become the legitimate leader
of the group. Whether this will come about will depend on the actor's
amount of support, that is, the number of positive pattern parts the actor
possesses, and the actor's reward expectations. The amount of support
necessary will depend on situational factors, and the reward expectations

will depend on the status characteristics of the actor. We should point

out that this process is only one of many ways in which the power-andprestige order of a group may be legitimated, but that this process is

particularly relevant to informal task groups of previously unacquainted
individuals.

When the power-and-prestige order is legitimated, the actors come to

behave as though they had socially defined status positions, positions
that have normative rights, privileges, and duties associated with them.
Obviously the top, or leadership, position is of special importance in a
legitimate order, as the leader is assigned special executive rights. In
particular, the leader has the right to address the group as a whole, and
this has significant implications for the patterns of participation in the
group.

3 The assumption as well as the previous argument, which assumes that the three

actors A, B, and C are not discriminated by status characteristics, is motivated by
results presented by Chase (1982). Farraro and Skvoretz (1988) have presented a
formal analysis of Chase's results and formulated a general theory of dominance

orders. At the same time, although we know of no application of social learning theory
to interaction patterns in small groups, it is clearly the case that these assumptions
are consistent with the general principles of that theory as well (Rotter 1954; Bandura
1977).

120
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An Expectation Measure for Multiactor Situations
Expectation states theory normally speaks of the power-and-prestige po-

sition of an actor with respect to a single other actor, and the measure

of relative expectations is the expectation advantage, which is defined as
the difference between the actor's expectations for self and those for the
other. However, for multiactor situations such as the ones we are concerned with, this measure is not appropriate since an actor can be simul-

taneously interacting with more than one other actor. Therefore, we need
a measure that can place an actor on the expectation dimension with
respect to a number of other actors simultaneously. We proceed as

follows.
The model generates actors' expectation values, which are measured

on a scale running from minus one to plus one. While such scaling reflects
the qualitative significance of expectations, it makes multiple compari-

sons difficult to formulate algebraically. Therefore, we begin by adding
one to each expectation value, making them all nonnegative. We can
then formulate a measure by dividing each of these new values by their
sum over all the interactants in the situation. These operations can be
symbolically expressed as below.

1 + ei

Si =:

E(1 + ej)
j=1

The measure s represents what we call "expectation standing," with
the subscript identifying the actor in question. The e's stand for expecta-

tion values for the actors, and n is the number of actors in the situation.
The s represents the proportion of the total expectations in the situation
for an actor and thus places an actor on the expectation dimension relative to all others in the group.

THEORY AND MODEL

Given the theoretical considerations of the previous sections we can formulate an extension of the theory of status characteristics and expectation
states that applies to multiactor, status-heterogeneous, and statushomogeneous situations. We first formulate a general theory and then
construct a specific model based on the theory for Bales-type discussion
groups.

121
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a1

b(+)

B(+)

Y(+)

D(+) Fr(+) C*(+) T(+)

a2

b(-)

a3

B(-)

D(-)

Y(-)

()T(-)

FIG. 1.-A situational structure with two male actors with a behavior pattern
between them and a female actor. All unsigned lines are positive.

The Theory

The scope of the formulation covers collectively oriented task groups.
The task must be valued, and the actors must take each others' behaviors

into account in performing the task. The actors may, or may not, be
discriminated by diffuse or specific status characteristics. We refer to a
situation that fulfills these conditions as an S situation. We construct a

graph diagram to represent the structure of an S situation (see fig. 1).
This diagram is constructed from the point of view of one particular

actor. However, at this point we assume that there is consensus, so that
the structure is the same from the points of view of all the actors in the

situation.4 Actors and status elements, such as states of status characteristics that are salient in the situation, are represented as points in the graph
structure. Three relations, represented by signed lines in the graph, can
hold between these elements: actors may possess states of status characteristics, and a state of one status characteristic may be relevant to a
state of a different status characteristic. Possession and relevance are

"positive" relations. The third relation, which is "negative" and is
called dimensionality, holds between the two differentially evaluated

states of the same characteristic possessed by actors in the situation, such
as male and female, indicating their linkage and opposition. The graph
of the situation always contains two elements that represent outcome

states: these are T(+) and T(-), success and failure at the task, respectively. Two other points representing the high and low states of the

4 Situations where actors have different points of view of a given situation are, obviously, of special substantive interest. However, the modeling of such situations is
something to be attempted in the future after we model the simpler situations where
there is consensus.
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instrumental ability (i.e., the ability that is necessary for successful task
performance) are also in the graph of the situation, and these elements
are relevant to the similarly signed task outcome states. Thus, the initial
graph of any S situation consists of a set of unconnected points representing the actors in S, two task outcome states, and two states of the instru-

mental ability, C*(+) and C*(-), which are relevant to the outcome
states.

The initial structure is completed through the salience and burden-ofproof processes. There are two conditions under which status characteristics become salient-when they are initially relevant to the task or when

they discriminate between the actors in the situation. It should be noted
that salience is a theoretical state and not a question of visibility. A status
characteristic that does not satisfy these conditions is not predicted to
become salient even though it is highly visible. Similar conditions need
to be stated for the salience of behavior patterns.
There are many theoretically reasonable relations that may obtain between the salience of status characteristics and behavior patterns. Until
we learn more about these elements we apply the principle of providing
relevant information to the salience of behavior patterns as well. A behavior pattern, b(+) and b(-), will become salient if it provides new

status information in the situation. If two actors are discriminated by a
status characteristic, and a behavior pattern consistent with the status

difference emerges, that outcome is consistent and provides no new information. If, however, the emergent behavior pattern is inconsistent with

an existing status characteristic difference, then the pattern will become
salient. Similarly, when actors are not discriminated by status characteristics, behavior patterns provide new bases of status differentiation, and
therefore they will become salient.5

ASSUMPTION 1*: The salience of behavior interchange patterns.
Given a behavior interchange pattern that occurs between an actor and
one or more other actors, the states of the behavior interchange pattern

will become salient (i) if the actors are not discriminated by other status
elements or (ii) if the parts of the behavior interchange pattern are inconsistent with status elements that discriminate the actors.

The burden-of-proof assumption of the core theory describes how salient status elements that are not connected to the task at the outset

become connected. The name reflects the basic principle that unless a
status element is explicitly dissociated from the task, it will come to be
connected to the similarly signed task outcome state; that is, positive

5 We use asterisks after the assumption numbers to indicate assumptions that are
meant to be taken in conjunction with the assumptions of the Berger et al. (1977)
original formulation with the same number.
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elements will become relevant to success and negative elements will become relevant to failure, even if indirectly. The same principle applies

to behavior patterns. When they become salient, the status typification
states, B( +) and B(-), to which they are relevant, became activated,

and through the burden-of-proof process these states become relevant to
like-signed states of abstract task ability.

ASSUMPTION 2*: The burden of proof through status-typification states.
Given that a behavior interchange pattern is salient, its relevant statustypification states will be activated. These states will become relevant to
similarly evaluated states of abstract task ability, and the latter will
become relevant to similarly evaluated outcome states of the task.
The sequencing of the structure-completion assumption of the core
theory describes how the salience and burden-of-proof assumptions operate to further complete the situational structure as new actors become
interactants and new status characteristics become salient in the situa-

tion. We need to add to this assumption that the structure will be further
completed as new behavior interchange patterns emerge in the situation.
Each new behavior pattern, if it becomes salient, will result in structure
development, and expectations will be changed or modified.
Behavior patterns, unlike status characteristics, are temporal in na-

ture. That is, they refer to behavior that occurs over time, and a salient

behavior pattern need not be observable at all times. We believe that
once a behavior pattern is established and becomes salient it will remain

salient even if it is not observable. However, a new behavior pattern
that reverses the parts of the actors may become salient, in which case
the older pattern is replaced. Thus, if there is a salient behavior interchange pattern such that actor A defers to actor B but over time a new
behavior interchange pattern emerges such that actor B defers to actor

A, it is not so much that a new status element has been added to those
existing, but that a status element has been changed. The new pattern
replaces the old, and the earlier pattern is no longer a part of the
structure.

ASSUMPTION 3*: Structure completion of behavior patterns. Every
time a new behavior interchange pattern becomes salient, the structure
will be further completed. If a new behavior interchange pattern emerges
in which the pattern parts possessed by two actors are reversed, then
lines joining the actors with these new pattern parts are, added to the
graph structure replacing the old possession lines, which are dropped.

Figure 1 shows a situational structure with two male and one female

actors designated as a,, a2, and a3. The task is not sex typed, but the
diffuse status characteristic, gender, which we designate by D in our
diagrams, discriminates between the actors and therefore becomes salient
in the situation. A behavior pattern, represented by b(+) and b(-),
124
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between the two males has emerged, and the behavior pattern and its
typification states, represented by B(+) and B(-), also become salient

as the two males, a, and a2, are not discriminated by a status characteristic. Since the diffuse status characteristic is not initially relevant to the
task, it becomes task connected through the activated states of generalized expectations represented by F(+) and F(-), and the structure is
completed.

Given the graph structure we determine the lengths and signs of the
paths connecting each actor to the task outcome states.6 In this example,
actor a1 is connected to the positive task outcome state (T[ +]) by two

positive paths of four lengths and to the negative outcome state (T[ -])
by two positive paths of five lengths for a total of four positive paths.

We assume that the strength, or the contribution to expectations, of each
path is given by a function f(i), where i is the length of the path. The
function yields values in the range (0,1) and is a decreasing function of

path length. The formation of aggregated expectation states assumption
describes how expectations for actors can be computed from the strengths
of the paths connecting them to the task outcome states.

ASSUMPTION 4: Formation of aggregated expectation states. If an
actor x is connected to the task outcome states by sets of positive and
negative paths, these paths will first be combined within like-signed subsets to yield a positive-path value e + and a x
negative-path
value e - in
~~~~~~~~~~~x

the following fashion. Given strengths f(i), . . ., f(n) and f(i'), . . .

f(n') of paths within the positive-path subset and negative-path subset,
respectively, then:

xe+ = -1f (i)] . .. [1f(n)] ,
The aggregated expectation state is then given by

ex= e)+ + ex
The important point to note is that behavior interchange patterns enter
into the formation of aggregated expectations exactly as other status elements do and combine with them in the formation of expectations. This

unified treatment of different status elements allows us to capture the
entirety of the "expectations-to-behavior-to-expectations" cycle within
one formulation. We can now describe the emergence of power and prestige orders on the basis of status characteristics, behavioral feedback,

and the combination of both status characteristics and behavior. In this
way the formulation can be used to explain and to predict behavior in
both heterogeneous and homogeneous groups.
6 For a detailed description of path counting see Berger et al. (1977).
125
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Expectation standings are assumed to be the determinants of the

power-and-prestige order. We present below a version of the basic expectation assumption, formulated for more than two actors.

ASSUMPTION 5: Basic expectation assumption. Given that p has
formed aggregated expectation states for self and others, p's power-andprestige position will be a direct, continuous function of p's expectation
standing in S.
This assumption has been stated in general terms, and we express
these concepts in functional form when we construct specific models.
However, before we undertake specific model construction, legitimation

effects need to be included in the formulation. We believe that, if a
sufficiently large number of actors establish behavior patterns with respect to one other actor such that the one actor possesses the positive
pattern part in all cases, then they will all come to behave as though that
actor was their legitimate leader. We believe that this can happen provided that the others in the group do not hold expectations that the top
actor, on the basis of all his salient external status characteristics, will
possess a low-valued status position in the group (Ridgeway and Berger
1988).

AUXILIARY ASSUMPTION 1: Legitimation on the basis of behavior patterns. Assume that a sufficiently large subset of actors have formed

low-high behavior patterns with respect to the top actor in the powerand-prestige order. Assume further that the actors in the group do not
hold expectations that the top actor will possess a low-valued status
position in the group. The actors will come to behave as if the top actor's
power-and-prestige position is a legitimate one.
This assumption is called the "legitimation on the basis of behavior
assumption" because, as we have noted before and as the literature
suggests (Ridgeway and Berger 1988), legitimation of the power-andprestige order can come about in different ways. The implication of the

assumption is that legitimation results in a change for the top actor in
how expectations are translated to behavior. As the previous discussion
suggests, this change is of special importance for the behavior of the top

actor in the power-and-prestige order as he or she takes on a leadership
role. The assumption tells us that the prediction function has to have a

different form for groups with and without legitimated power-andprestige orders.

The Specific Model
The formulation is quite general. Within its scope conditions, the effects

of a number of situational variables may result in quite different configurations of behavior patterns. Different kinds of groups operating under
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different conditions can develop linear structures, segmented structures,
incomplete structures, or even no stable structures at all. Furthermore,

different kinds of power-and-prestige behaviors may be different functions of expectation standing. Therefore, it is necessary to construct specific models for given types of groups and given kinds of power-andprestige behaviors by making additional assumptions about the process
of emergence of behavior patterns and the functional relationship of behavior to expectations. We will now construct such a specific model for
predicting participation rates in the Bales group setting.

The pertinent features of the Bales group setting are that it is a laboratory situation where a number (usually 2-12) of previously unacquainted

subjects are given a discussion task, such as a human relations case, and
are asked to reach a group decision in a limited amount of time. The
subjects have no expectations for extended interaction as a group and
therefore are unlikely to have a high level of personal investment in the
group.

The time limitation forces the group to develop a structure quickly,
and the need to reach a group decision, coupled with the relative lack of
personal investment, works against status struggles, although they do
occur. These conditions also make it unlikely that behavior patterns develop inconsistently with any existing status characteristic differences or
that established behavior patterns get reversed during a group session.
Furthermore, the fact that behavior patterns can be observed by all
actors makes it unlikely that behavior patterns emerge in intransitive

configurations. At the same time, the literature on Bales groups suggests
that power-and-prestige orders appear very quickly and are usually linear

(Bales et al. 1951; Fi?ek and Ofshe 1970). We therefore make the simplest
assumption that will generate a unique pattern consistent with these
points.

SPECIFIC MODEL ASSUMPTION 1. In the Bales group setting the configuration of behavior patterns develops in a transitive manner consistent
with salient status characteristics and is fully completed.
Full completion of the configuration of behavior patterns refers to those
patterns that can be salient, that is, those between initial status equals.
The assumption is obviously a simple first approximation, but, given the
values of the function f(i), it enables us to compute expectations for all
actors in a given situation. We use the function values, given in table 1,
which have been theoretically generated by making assumptions about

the shape of the functionf(i) (Fi?ek, Norman, and Nelson-Kilger 1989).
We next need to estimate the size of the core group necessary to generate a legitimate power-and-prestige order. Our approach to this estima7These calculations are available from the authors on request.
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TABLE 1

THEORETICALLY DERIVED PATH STRENGTHS

Path Lengths Path Strengths
2

................

..............................

.6321

3 ................. .............................. .3175

4 ................ .............................. .1358
5 ................. .............................. .0542
6

................

..............................

.0211

tion problem is quite informal: we look for a reasonable assumption
rather than apply formal estimation procedures. Table 2 below gives the
rates of participation of the top two initiators for groups of three to eight
actors for the original Bales data (Bales 1970).
The top part of the table gives the total rates of participation and

displays a trend that was one of the earliest to be noted in studies of Bales
groups (Bales et al. 1951): the difference in participation rate between the

top two actors increases with group size. However, our discussion of
legitimation suggests that it would be more appropriate to look separately

at rates of addressing the group as a whole and addressing individuals
because leadership is more likely to be manifested in addressing the group
as a whole. The rest of the table gives the rates for addressing the group
as a whole and as individuals separately. Very much in line with our
account of legitimation, the trend of the differences between the two top
actors is enhanced when rates of speaking to the group as a whole are

considered, but this trend disappears when rates of addressing individuals are considered. Furthermore, the trend is not linear but resembles a

step function. The difference in rates is small for groups of three and
four actors, increases dramatically for groups of five, and then remains
essentially constant. This is again consistent with our account of legitimation and suggests that legitimate leadership may become possible in
groups of five.

In formulating prediction functions, one would normally think in terms

of parameterized functions so that the effects of variables, other than the
independent variable, on the dependent variable can be captured. There
is no question that the degree of differentiation in the rates of participa-

tion will be affected by contextual variables such as degree of task orientation and the importance of the task. However, we shall start out by

trying the simplest possible functions, even if they involve no parameters.
Since the legitimation assumption implies that the functional relation
of expectation standing to behaviors will change with legitimation, we
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TABLE 2
PARTICIPATION RATES OF THE Two TOP ACTORS IN THE

ORIGINAL BALES GROUPS BY GROUP SIZE

GROUP SIZE
ACTOR

3

4

5

6

7

8

Total:

One ....................... . 444 .322 .469 .431 .431 .398
Two ................. .327 .289 .219 .188 .152 .166
To group:

One ................. .512 .365 .707 .621 .638 .577
Two ................. .272 .291 .119 .131 .087 .090
To individuals:
One ................. .393 .296 .271 .288 .247 .249

Two ................. .363 .288 .302 .231 .209 .229

N

.........

........

26

89

9

18

15

8

need two different functions: one function for predicting rates of speaking

to the group as a whole when the power-and-prestige order is legitimated
and another function for predicting the other rates of participation.
Considering the relationship between expectation standings and participation rates in general, the simplest possible functional relationship is

that of equality. Both variables are measured in the same interval (0,1),
they both sum to one for a given group, and the substance of the relationship is that the greater the expectation standing, the greater the participa-

tion rate. Therefore, we use the identity function in the simpler case,
that is, for rates in groups without legitimated orders and for rates of
speaking to individuals in groups with legitimated orders. However,
something a little more complicated is called for in predicting the rates
of speaking to the group as a whole in groups with legitimated orders.

When addressing the others as a single entity, the leader is interacting
with them as if they were a single individual with status typical for their
numbers. The "massed" other's expectation standing is simply expressed

as the arithmetic mean of the expectation standings of the others. To
obtain the leader's and the others' total share of speaking to the group

as a whole from these two expectation standings, we normalize them so

that they sum to one. The total share of the others can then be allocated
among them in proportion to their expectation standings. These ideas are
summarized in the assumption below.
SPECIFIC MODEL ASSUMPTION 2. In the Bales group setting an

actor's rate of participation will be equal to the actor's expectation stand-
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ing, except for the rate of speaking to the group as a whole in groups
with legitimated power-and-prestige orders, in which case the rate for
the leader will be given by
Si

gl = l~
s +

and for the others by

gi = (1- g1 ) i = 2, ..., n.
The first formula gives the leader's rate of addressing the group as a

whole. The fraction in the denominator is the mean expectation standing
of the others in the group: since expectation standings sum to one, one
minus the leader's expectation standing gives the sum of the others'
expectation standings, and (n - 1), where n is the number of actors in
the group, is the number of others. Thus, the first formula is the normalization of the leader's expectation standing with the mean expectation

standing of the others in the group. The second formula gives the rates
for the other members: (1 - g1) is the others' total share, and the second
factor is the actor's expectation standing renormalized by leaving out the
leader's expectation standing. This assumption completes the specific
model, and we can now predict participation rates for Bales group settings where actors may, or may not, be discriminated by status characteristics.

We will demonstrate the actual computational procedure in terms of
one of the cases in the Bales setting that will be used in the assessment

of fit. Let us consider one of the Smith-Lovin groups, the three-male/
three-female group: the graph of the situation, although not complicated,
is too dense to be displayed here; however, its verbal description is

straightforward enough. Since gender discriminates the actors it will become salient, and since it is not relevant to the task it will become connected through the burden-of-proof process. This means that each male

in the group will be connected to the task by two positive paths of four

and five lengths. Similarly, each female will be connected to the task
with two negative paths of the same lengths. Since the specific model
assumes that behavior patterns cannot be inconsistent with status charac-

teristic differentiation and the formulation asserts that behavior patterns
consistent with status characteristics will not be salient, there will be no

behavior patterns between the males and the females, but only among
same-gender subsets. Since the specific model assumes complete and tran-

sitive emergence of behavior patterns, there will be one actor in each
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TABLE 3
EXPECTATION STANDINGS OF THE ACTORS IN THE THREE-MALE/THREE-FEMALE
SMITH-LOVIN GROUPS

Positive Negative Expec- Expectation

Actors Paths* Paths* tations Standings

Male 1 ............ 3 X 4, 3 X 5 . .454 .242
Male 2 ............ 2 X 4, 2 X 5 4, 5 .149 .192

Male

3

4,

5

2

X

4,

2

X

5

-.149

.142

Female 1 ......... 2 x 4, 2 X 5 4, 5 .149 .192

Female

2

4,

5

2

X

4,

2

X

5

-.149

.142

Female 3 ......... ... 3 X 4, 3 X 5 -.454 .091
* Number of paths x path length.

subset who possesses the positive parts of two behavior patterns with
respect to the other two. Therefore, this actor will have four positive

paths due to behavior patterns, two of four lengths and two of five
lengths, connecting the actor to the task. In each same-gender subset, a

second actor will possess one positive and one negative pattern part, and
the third two negative pattern parts; each will be connected to the task
accordingly. The paths for all six actors are given in table 3.
In this table the first column lists the positive paths, and the second

column lists the negative ones. The third column gives the expectations
for each actor, which we computed using the path strengths in table 1 and
the combining rule. The fourth column gives the expectation standings
computed from these expectations. Since this is a group in which legiti-

mation is assumed not to occur, the expectation standings are also the
predicted participation rates. That is, the model predicts that the top
participator will be male with a participation rate of .242, that a male
and a female will tie for the second participation rank with rates of . 192,

and so forth. Had this group been one where legitimation is assumed
to occur, then the expectation standings would be the predictions for

participations directed to individuals, and the rates for addressing the
group as a whole would be obtained by applying the transformations of

specific model assumption 2 to the expectation standings.

GOODNESS OF FIT

At this point we need to demonstrate that our theoretical formulation and
the specific model we have constructed are consistent with the available
empirical evidence. As our starting point was Skvoretz's (1988) work,

the first set of data we will examine is that of Smith-Lovin et al. (1986).
We have also sought data from other groups in Bales-type settings where
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discrimination among actors is systematically provided by status charac-

teristics. We have been able to find one such set of data in a set of studies
carried out by E. G. Cohen and her associates (Cohen 1972; Cohen and
Roper 1985) that provides data on four-person groups composed of two
"high-status" and two "low-status" actors discriminated by one charac-

teristic that is different in each study. We will also assess the fit of the
model to this set of data as a further "test" of the theoretical formulation
and model. Since our formulation applies to both heterogeneous and
homogeneous groups we also need to explore its fit to homogeneous
groups. There are a large number of published studies of homogeneous
groups in the Bales setting; however, after eliminating studies outside
our scope of conditions-that is, those that use appointed leaders or

feature role playing instead of normal interaction and those that do not
report data in usable form-few remain. Of those that do remain, the

original Bales data are by far the largest body of comparable data. Therefore, we explore the fit of the model to the original Bales data as examples
of homogeneous groups. Since all the data predate the construction of
the model, our evaluation of goodness of fit is not a test of the model as
such but an assessment of the consistency of the model with the available
data. We evaluate the fit of the model to the mean rates of participation
for groups of given size and composition.

Our first assessment of fit is simply the comparison of predicted and
observed participation rates for each set of data, and, where possible,
we use the standard error of the observed value to assess the goodness
of fit. This commonsense approach has traditionally been used with participation rate models for Bales groups (see Kadane and Lewis 1969).
The second step is to do a regression of the observed rates on the pre-

dicted rates. Regression analysis offers some important advantages in
assessing goodness of fit. First, it provides a summary measure, R2, for
the entire data set. Furthermore, the measure has a very straightforward
interpretation as the percentage of the variation explained in the observed

by the predicted, and it is a commonly used measure in most quantitative
work. Second, examination of the regression coefficients and the residuals
can tell us about systematic biases the model might have. However, it
should be noted that there is dependence in our data: if the model overpredicts a participation rate for one rank for a given group, it is going

to have to underpredict another; participation rates for a given type of
group sum to one. This can cause autocorrelation, and, while autocorre-

lation does not bias parameter estimates, it can cause inflation of R2
(Hanushek and Jackson 1977; Judge et al. 1985). However, it is positive
autocorrelation that inflates R2, and, in our case, the structure of dependence should produce negative autocorrelation, and the Durbin-Watson
statistic can give warning of positive serial autocorrelation. We reduce
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the degrees of freedom of the error variance by one for each type of group
in a given data set to counteract the dependence. The regressions are

also weighted by the square root of the sample size for each group size
and composition since within a set of data there usually are different
numbers of given types of groups.

The Smith-Lovin Data
These data are from six-person groups in the Bales setting, where the

sex composition of the groups has been systematically varied from all
male to all female. In assessing the fit of the model to these data we

encounter the following problem: our model predicts that in all-male
and in five-male/one-female groups the power-and-prestige order will be
legitimated, so that the participation directed to individuals and to the

group as a whole should be predicted separately. But in the published

data, participations directed to the group as a whole and directed to
individuals are not reported separately. We need to know at least the

overall proportion of acts directed to the group as a whole in order to
combine the predicted to-individuals and to-group participation rates in
our efforts to obtain a predicted total participation rate. Therefore, we

estimate this proportion as a parameter by doing a simple grid search
optimizing the fit of the regression model for these two types of groups.
The estimate we obtain is that 17% of the acts are directed to the group

as a whole. We use this value to generate total participation predictions

for the all-male and five-male/one-female groups, and reduce the residual
degrees of freedom by one in the regression analysis. Table 4 gives the

observed and predicted proportions of participation for each initiation
rank within each sex for these groups.
In this table, for each group composition the first column gives the
predicted participation rate, the second column the observed participa-

tion rate, and the third column the sample standard error (SE). Numbers
in italic mark those predictions that are more than two SEs away from

the observed. For each group composition, the males are listed first in
order of their participation rank among themselves; the females are then
listed in the same order. Examining the table, we note that out of the 42

predictions 10 differ from the observed by more than two SEs. It is
probably the case that the sample sizes are too small to wash out individual differences, so that predictions for particular ranks are not successful.

However, the model does capture the general features of the distribu-

tions, such as the fact that the proportions of participation for the top
actor in all-male and five-male/one-female groups are higher than in the

other groups, as predicted by the model. Therefore, we feel justified in
looking further at the overall fit of the model.
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The regression results are given in the notes to table 4. Quite obviously,
the R2 value obtained is quite high. Thus it seems that, although the
model's point predictions are off in a number of cases, the model does
describe the overall features of the data quite well. Examining the coefficients of the regression equation, we see that the regression coefficient is
larger than one by more than two SEs and the intercept is also less than
zero by more than two SEs. This indicates that the model is underpredicting the higher participation rates and overpredicting the lower rates.
However, the effect is not very large. The residual plots indicate an

autocorrelation effect, but the Durbin-Watson statistic is not high enough
to indicate a significant first-order serial correlation and is in the negative
direction.

There is one further way we can evaluate the goodness of fit of the
model predictions to the data. The model predicts the rank positions of
the males and the females for each gender composition, so that these
orders can be compared to the observed orders. The data are reported
in this form in table 5.

There are no measures of concordance for rankings in which the elements ranked are not individually identified. Therefore, we have constructed an ad hoc index the values of which are given in table 5. The
index is the ratio of the correctly predicted pairwise orderings to the total
pairwise comparisons, excluding the ties. The agreement between the

predicted and observed orders is perfect in three cases out of five, slightly
off in one case, and not very good in the fifth case. Our general evaluation
is that the model does well in describing the overall distribution of participation rates.

The Cohen Situation Data

E. G. Cohen and her colleagues have conducted a series of studies to
develop intervention techniques for changing expectations to counteract
the negative effects of status characteristic discrimination in educational
contexts (Cohen 1972; Cohen and Roper 1985). Each study in this set
contains a control condition used to evaluate the effect of interventions
in the experimental conditions. These control conditions meet the conditions of the Bales setting, the only difference being that in most of the
studies the task is playing a board game instead of the typical Bales
discussion task. However, the actors have to discuss their moves and
come to a group decision as to how they are going to move the marker

on the game board. The game is not competitive but cooperative, the

goal being to reach the target and win as a group as quickly as possible.
Each. group is composed of four actors, two from a high-status category,
and two from a low-status category.
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TABLE 5
PREDICTED AND OBSERVED MALE/FEMALE RANK ORDERS IN THE SMITH-LOVIN GROUPS

FIVE

FOUR

MALE/

MALE/

ONE

Two

THREE
MALE/

THREE

Two

ONE

MALE/

MALE/

FOUR

FIVE

FEMALE FEMALE FEMALE FEMALE FEMALE

P

0

1.............M

2

.............

3

.............

.............

............
.............

M

.1.00

P

M

M

M

M

F

0

M

M

M

5

Index

M

M

4
6

P

M

F

M

M

F

M
F

.57

M

P

M

MF

MF

F

0

M

M

M

F

F

M
F

1.00

F

P

0

F

M

M

F

F

MF

MF

M

0

F

M

F

F

F

M

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F
F

F

1.00

.80

We will examine data from five studies in this series. Three of these
studies use the game task. Of these studies, one by Mark Lohman (1970)
uses black and white junior high school students as subjects. The other
two studies, by R. A. Morris (1977) and by Susan J. Rosenholtz (1977),
look at the effects of a specific characteristic-reading-ability reputation.

Of the four elementary school students who participate in a group, two
are reputedly good readers, and two are reputedly poor readers. The
remaining two studies, one by K. P. Hall (1972) and one by Marlaine E.
Lockheed (1976), use a discussion task and look at male and female

subjects who are teacher trainees. The participation rates observed in

these groups and the model's predictions are given in table 6.
We do not have the SEs for these observed participation rates and
therefore cannot evaluate the closeness of the predictions in such terms.
However, the agreement between the predicted and the observed looks
reasonable by visual inspection. The average difference between them is

.0147; that is, it is less than 1.5%. It is interesting to note that the model
predicts that the less active actor of the higher-status category and the
more active actor of the lower-status category will have equal participation rates. In four of the five cases, this prediction is in good agreement

with the data; in the fifth case, the Hall study, there is a fairly marked

differentiation between the two actors. Despite this deviation, our evaluation is that the model describes the data quite well.

The regression results are given in the notes to table 6. The R2 is
high, even higher than that for the Smith-Lovin data. The coefficient of
regression and the intercept indicate a tendency to underestimate high

values and overestimate low values. This same tendency was also observed for the Smith-Lovin data; as in that earlier case, there is little
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reason to be concerned with this small effect at this stage of theoretical

development. Residual plots indicate the existence of autocorrelated error; however, the Durbin-Watson statistic is not large enough to indicate
a significant first-order serial effect and again is in the direction of negative autocorrelation. We have to conclude that the model fits this set of
data, which includes data from groups with fairly different tasks, with

different subject populations, and discriminated by different status characteristics, quite well.

The Original Bales Data

Finally, we would like to assess the fit of the model of the original Bales
data (Bales 1970). Bales data are coded separately for to-individuals and
to-group participations, so we can fit the model separately for the two

kinds of behaviors. This enables us to evaluate the legitimation aspects
of the model in direct terms. Table 7 gives the distributions of the observed and predicted participation rates.
It should be pointed out that the basic initiation rank of actors was

determined using total participations by Bales. Therefore, when to-individuals and to-group participations are separated, their orderings can

disagree. This can be observed for the top ranks in groups of five. Such
a reversal is not consistent with our model; however, the difference in
the magnitudes of the two rates is small and, given the small number of
groups of this size, need not cause serious concern. In fact, the general
agreement between the predicted and observed participation rates seems

to be quite good by visual inspection. The mean difference between them
is .015, similar to the fits of earlier models (see Kadane and Lewis 1969).

We do two separate regression analyses. One is for the total participation rates in groups with two to four actors (for these groups the model

does not predict different to-group and to-individuals participation rates)
and the to-individuals participation rates in groups with five to eight
actors. The second is for the to-group participation rates in groups with
five to eight actors. The results of these regression analyses are given in
the notes to table 7.

For the first regression, the R2 value is large. Both the regression

coefficient and the intercept differ from one and zero, respectively, by
about one SE. The Durbin-Watson statistic, though on the positive side,
is close to two, which is the mean value under the null hypothesis. We
conclude that the model fits the data well.

For the second regression, the R2 value is even higher; however, the
Durbin-Watson statistic is quite low-though not low enough to be significant (at al = .05 with n = 25 the critical values of D are DL = 1.29

and Du = 1.45). Residual plots also indicate that there is autocorrelation;
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therefore, spurious inflation of the R2 is a distinct possibility. However,
even given this precautionary note, we will still have to conclude that

the fit is good and that overall the model is in good agreement with
Bales's original data.

SUMMARY STATEMENT

We started out to formulate a theory that could account for the structuring of power-and-prestige orders in both status-heterogeneous and
status-homogeneous groups in open interaction situations. We have done
so by integrating two theories within the expectation states theory framework, the theory of status characteristics, and the theory of evolution of
expectations. We have also introduced elements of legitimation dynamics
into the theory. The resulting formulation, which is an extension of the

mathematical version of the theory of status characteristics and expectation states, can be used to predict the power-and-prestige orderings in
status-heterogeneous and, initially, status-homogeneous groups.
We have constructed a specific model, based on the theory, to predict
rates of participation in Bales-type settings. We believe that this model
fits the data reported by Smith-Lovin quite well. We have demonstrated
that the same model also fits data on heterogeneous groups collected by

E. G. Cohen and her associates. We have also shown that the model fits
the original Bales data. The goodness of fit in each case, as measured by

R2, is good. It should also be noted that the model requires very little in
the way of estimating empirical parameters. The only such quantities to
be used in the assessment of fit presented above were the size of the core
group necessary for legitimation and the proportion of to-group participa-

tions in the Smith-Lovin data. We believe our formulation, incorporating

as it does the full feedback cycle of expectations to behavior and behavior
to expectations, has furthered our understanding of the evolution of

power-and-prestige orders and is capable of generating further empirical
and theoretical research.
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